St. John's Law Review
Volume 42
Number 1 Volume 42, July 1967, Number 1

Article 39

CPLR 5001: Pre-verdict Interest Not Allowed
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
AI.TICLE 50 -

[ VOL. 42

JUDGMENTs GENERALLY

CPLR 5001.." Pre-verdict interest not allowed.
The well-established rule in New York is that pre-verdict
interest is not allowable oft a verdict for personal injuries. 0 7 The
rationale behind this rule is twofold: (1) "the damage award in
such a case most often includes compensation for future loss, and
therefore to add interest would be duplicatory," 108 and (2) "such
damages are rarely measurable by external economic standards," 1 09
so that having interest computed on an award so inherently arbitrary has been considered inadvisable.
However, a problem arises when an action for personal injuries is grounded upon a breach of contract. CPLR 5001(a),
a continuation, with minor modification, of CPA § 480, provides
that "interest shall be recovered upon a sum awarded because of
a breach of performance of a contract. ..."
The appellate division, first department, interpreted the CPA
section to mean that pre-verdict interest on a personal injury
award was allowable if the suit was based upon a breach of contract."
Apparently, the first department courts will continue to
construe CPLR 5001 in the same fashion.""
However, under the CPA, courts in the second department
refused to allow pre-verdict interest in a personal injury action
whether or not the suit was based upon breach of contract. 2
In
a recent decision, Gillespie v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.," 3 there
was a verdict for personal injuries based upon a breach of warranty of fitness for use. The court, in refusing to allow pre-

KOR" & MILLER, Nmv YoRx CIVIL PRACriCE 1 5001.07
An exception to this rule is in wrongful death actions. N.Y.
DEcED. EsT. LAw § 132.
10s DeLong Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 20 App. Div. 2d 104, 109,
244 N.Y.S.2d 859, 864 (lst Dep't 1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 346, 200 N.E.2d
557, 251 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1964).
109 Ibid.
110 Brown v. Godefroy Mfg. Co., 278 App. Div. 242, 104 N.Y.S2d 444
(1st Dep't 1951). Since the personal injury action had been grounded upon
a breach of warranty of fitness for use, pre-verdict interest was awarded.
See also Miller v. Foltis Fisher Inc., 152 Misc. 24, 272 N.Y. Supp. 712 (App.
T. 1st Dep't 1934).
"I In Gellman v. Hotel Corp. of America, 46 Misc. 2d 521, 260 N.Y.S.2d
154 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1965), the court allowed pre-verdict interest in a personal injury action based on breach of warranty.
112 West v. L. J. F. Corp., 207 N.Y.S.2d 715 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1960).
Here, plaintiff alleged a breach of contract as defendant, a common carrier,
failed to prevent an assault upon her by another passenger. The court held
that the cause of action was basically in tort.
13 26 App. Div. 2d 953, 276 N.Y.S.2d 372 (2d Dep't 1966).
107 5

(1966).
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verdict interest, expressly rejected first department cases allowing it
in similar situations.
Actually, the reasons that have motivated the courts to disallow pre-verdict interest in personal injury actions based upon
tort are still applicable when the plaintiff frames his complaint so
that it is based upon contract. In any event, it seems that a
decision by the Court of Appeals or a legislative re-evaluation is
warranted to prevent forum shopping within the state.
ARTICLE 52-
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JUDGMENTS

CPLR 5201: Seider procedure held constitutional.
Not unexpectedly, the constitutionality of the holding in Seider
114 was recently endorsed by the supreme court, Albany
County, in a factually similar case. In Jones v. McNeil, 115 the
accident out of which the cause of action arose occurred in New
Mexico. Defendants, residents of California, were personally served
there, and an auto liability policy issued to defendants by an
insurance company doing business in New York was attached by
plaintiff as the jurisdictional basis. The defendants argued that
the attachment of the insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify,
as a basis for jurisdiction, was violative of due process in contravention of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution.
The court answered that no deprivation of due process was
shown. First, there had been reasonable notice to the defendant
and sufficient opportunity for him to be heard. (He was personally
served in California, and given the right to appear within thirty
days.) Second, the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action. Last, there was a jurisdictional predicate, since
property of the defendant within the state was levied upon pursuant
to an order of attachment. This property was a res within the
state, allowing an adjudication as to whether the debt claimed by
plaintiff should be satisfied out of it.

v. Roth

CPLR 5201.: Rent income held attachable.
The plaintiff in Glassman v. Hyder" 6 attached a tenant's
obligation to the defendants for the payment of rent on a twenty114 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
The constitutionality of the procedure set forth in Seider was not there questioned or

considered. For a discussion of the import of Sceder, see The Quarterly
Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JON's L. REv. 463, 490 (1967).
"5 51 Misc. 2d 527, 273 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct Albany County 1966).
216

51 Misc. 2d 535 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1966).

